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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

: Case No. 940521-CA

v.
SHAUN LYNN FORSBERG,

: Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant to State

v. Clayton,

639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah

1981), the State of Utah files this Brief of Appellee in response
to the "Anders"

brief filed by counsel for defendant-appellant

Shaun Lynn Forsberg.

Forsberg appeals his conviction for "repeat

offender" driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(7) (Supp. 1994).
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1994).
I

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Defendant Forsberg advances a single issue on appeal,

which his appellate counsel asserts is frivolous: Whether
Forsberg Should be Allowed to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, Based
Upon His Assertion that the Plea was Induced by a Prosecutor

Agreement, Subsequently Breached, to Make a "No Incarceration"
Recommendation at Sentencing?1
State's counsel, however, has reviewed the record on'
appeal, and believes that it discloses another issue that may not
be frivolous: Whether Porsberg Should be Allowed to Withdraw his
Guilty Plea, Because the Plea Was Not Taken In Strict Compliance
with the Standards of Rule 11/ Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure/
and Utah Caselaw?
Standard

of Review:

Because Forsberg's appellate

counsel files his brief accompanied by a motion to withdraw as
counsel, under Anders

v.

California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), this

Court must make a "full examination of all the proceedings" and
decide whether the appeal is "wholly frivolous."
U.S. at 744/ State v.
State

v. Flores,

Clayton,

Anders,

386

639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1981);

855 P.2d 258, 259 (Utah App. 1993).

This is

necessarily a de novo process, in which deference to the trial
court (or to appellate counsel) is neither possible nor
appropriate.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1994), which sets the
offense levels for driving under the influence of alcohol, and
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing the

*In his statement of the issue, Forsberg's appellate counsel
miscasts the issue as one of sentencing discretion (Br. of
Appellant at 1) . However, elsewhere in his brief, he properly
identifies the "breached prosecutor promise" issue as one that, if
proven, would allow withdrawal of Forsberg's guilty plea (Br. of
Appellant at 7, 10) .
2

acceptance of guilty pleas, are copied in appendix I of this
brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Forsberg was charged with driving under the influence
of alcohol, with three prior convictions under the same section
within three years,

which constitutes

a third degree felony under

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(7) (Supp. 1994) (R. 1). Pursuant to a
plea bargain, he pled guilty to the charge (R. 10, 48-55).
Forsberg was sentenced to a prison term of zero to five years-with, however, the trial court's recommendation that he be
paroled to inpatient alcohol rehabilitation "as soon as
reasonably possible" (R. 25-26, 64).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The pertinent facts are those related to the entry of
Forsberg's guilty plea; the transcript of the arraignment and
plea process (R. 45-56) is copied in appendix II of this brief.
Forsberg's appellate counsel accurately recites that before
entering the plea, the prosecutor stated the terms of the plea
bargain as follows:
We've agreed basically to allow him credit for
time served and, if he's going into an in-patient
program, allow -- recommend that the court allow
him credit day to day on any time in the inpatient program against any jail time the court
wishes to give him. There's no agreement on the
amount of jail time or whether he will get
probation. If he does get probation we would
agree to recommend that he get those credits.
(R. 48). The trial court then asked if there were any more
recommendations and defense counsel responded, "no" (R. 48).
3

Forsberg also stated that no other promises had been made that
had not been disclosed to the court (R. 53).
The plea was entered orally, without additional
commemoration by written affidavit.

The trial court, questioning

Forsberg and his defense counsel, ascertained that Forsberg was
not under influence of alcohol or drugs, or duress (R. 51, 53).
The court explained the constitutional rights that Forsberg would
waive by his plea, and secured Forsberg's waiver of those rights
(R. 51-52).

The court stated the statutory elements of the

crime, and that the prosecutor's sentencing recommendations would
not be binding upon the court, and again secured Forsberg's
understanding (R. 52-53).
The trial court did not explain the minimum and maximum
sentence for the third degree felony; defense counsel, however,
stated that he and Forsberg had "talked about the consequences,
specifically in regards to a plea of a felony, and the prison
time he could be subjected to" (R. 50). The trial court did not
request, nor did the prosecutor proffer, the nature of the
evidence that would show Forsberg's guilt, if the matter were to
proceed to trial. Ultimately, finding Forsberg's guilty plea
knowing and voluntary, the trial court accepted it, then warned
Forsberg about the thirty-day time limit for moving to withdraw
the plea (R. 54-55).
Also pertinent to this "Anders"

appeal is the fact that

Forsberg's defense counsel was court-appointed, upon a showing

4

that Forsberg is indigent (R. 6 ) . That same attorney now desires
to withdraw from the case, having filed the "Anders"

brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Forsberg's appellate counsel correctly asserts that
Forsberg's guilty plea was not induced by any broken prosecutor
promise regarding a sentencing recommendation; hence, Forsberg's
bid to withdraw his plea on that basis is frivolous.

However,

the record revea] s a question whether the trial court fully,
complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in
accepting Forsberg's guilty plea.

This Court needs to examine

the record and pertinent caselaw to determine whether this
question is frivolous.

If it is not frivolous, this Court should

order further briefing.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE QUESTION WHETHER FORSBERG'S GUILTY PLEA
WAS INDUCED BY A FALSE PROSECUTOR PROMISE IS
FRIVOLOUS
In the single appellate issue identified by Forsberg's
counsel, Forsberg argues that under Santobello

v. New York,

404

U.S. 2S7 (1971), he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty
plea because the prosecutor breached a plea agreement to
recommend no incarceration for the pleaded-to offense.
agrees wit

The State

- jrsberg s coin ise] that that issue is frivolous.

This :-

so reasons.
First, Forsberg never moved

Santobello

"A defendant is oblige*
5

withdraw his plea under
^--

, trial court's

ruling on an issue before the issue can be raised in an appellate
court."

State v. Johnson,

(citing cases).

856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993)

He therefore waived this issue by failing to

present it to the trial court.
Second, apart from the waiver, Forsberg's
based issue is frivolous on its merits.

Santobello-

The prosecutor's

statement prior to entering the guilty plea clearly shows that no
"no incarceration" recommendation was promised:

"There's no

agreement on the amount of jail time or whether he will get
probation" (R. 48).
Were there any doubt about the absence of such promise,
it was dispelled at sentencing, some two months after Forsberg
pled guilty.

At that time, defense counsel asserted to the trial

court that "the State has made a recommendation of no prison
time" (R. 59). The prosecutor immediately corrected that
misstatement:
That's not correct. He would receive credit
for time served and he would receive credit for
any time served in an in-patient [alcohol abuse]
program. That can be done whether he goes to
prison or not. The court can recommend that the
department of -- that the prison people give him
credit for whatever time he's served up here.

There was no agreement on whether or not he would
go to prison and or serve time in the county
jail.
We would recommend that he receive credit for time
served. I don't know that he's been in any kind
of a program. If he has been then he should
receive credit for that also.
(R. 59 (emphasis added)).

Neither Forsberg nor defense counsel

then took issue with the prosecutor's foregoing statement of the
actual plea agreement.

Instead, the ensuing discussion focused
6

upon the proper sentencing disposition, given Forsberg's
individual history and needs (R. 59-65).
In sum, based upon the clear and uncontroverted trial
court record, Forsberg's SantoJbello-based appellate argument is
frivolous.

His appellate counsel, therefore, should not be

compelled to pursue this issue on appeal.
POINT TWO
THE QUESTION WHETHER FORSBERG'S PLEA WAS
PROPERLY ACCEPTED IS NOT NECESSARILY
FRIVOLOUS, AND WARRANTS THIS COURT'S
CONSIDERATION
Unfortunately, the State cannot confidently assert that
Forsberg's entire appeal

is frivolous.

Under Anders,

appointed

defense counsel must examine the r ecord for any possible
appellate issues, and can withdraw only upon a showing that no
See Anders,

non-frivolous issues exist.
withdraw, counsel must £Ind
(emphasis added)).

fl

his case

386 U.S. at 744 (to
to be wholly

This construction of counsel's duties is

supported by thr~- policy stated in Anders:
defendants the-

fr:i vol ous"

to "assure penniless

:i ghts and opportunities on app -eal - as nearly

-

as is practicable--as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a
similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of
private counsel. "

Id

at: 74 5.

Forsberg's present counsel

correctly finding the SantobelJo-based
not demonstrated that his client's case

issue

while

to be frivolous, has

is wholly bereft of non-

frivolous app e11 at € is s ue s.
It appears to the State that a non-frivolous issue, not
mentioned by Forsberg's counsel, may exist in this case.
7

We

emphasize "may exist," because it is this Court's duty--not the
State's — to make this determination.

Anders,

("the court--not counsel--then proceeds . . .
the case is wholly frivolous").

386 U.S. at 744
to decide whether

Accordingly, to serve this

Court, State's counsel points out an issue in this case that may
not be frivolous, but leaves to this Court the determination
whether it is or is not frivolous.
The possibly non-frivolous issue is whether Forsberg
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not
taken in strict compliance with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a requirement that has existed since the Utah
Supreme Court decided State
1987).

v.

Gibbons,

740 P.2d 13 09 (Utah

As follows, this issue encompasses two sub-issues.
First, there is a question whether rule 11(e) (5),

requiring that defendant understand the possible minimum and
maximum sentence, was adequately met, absent a corroborating plea
affidavit, by defense counsel's spoken assertion that "[w]e've
talked about the consequences, specifically in regards to a plea
of a felony, and the prison time [Forsberg] could be subjected
to" (R. 50). Second, there is a question whether a sufficient
"factual basis" for the plea was established, under State
Stilling,

856 P.2d 666, 671-74 (Utah App. 1993); Jbut see

v.
id.

at

677-78 (Jackson, J., concurring) (majority's "factual basis"
analysis is incorrect).
This Court must decide whether the foregoing questions,
which Forsberg's counsel might have raised but has not, are
8

frivolous.

If they are frivolous, counsel's motion to withdraw

should be granted, and this Court should affirm Forsberg's
conviction.

If they are not frivolous, further briefing should

be ordered.
CONCLUSION
The "breached prosecutor promise" argument advanced by
Porsluerxi i ;:i frivolous.

However, other questions involving the

validity of Forsberg's guilty plea may not be frivolous.

This

Court needs to carefully review the record on appeal to determine
the next step in this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q(

day of March, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY (j
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy ol the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to KENT
E. SNIDER, attorney for defendant-appellant, 2568 Washington
Boulevard, Suites 102, Ogden, Utah 84401 , thi s O (

day of March,

1995,
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APPENDIX I
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(7) (Supp. 1994)
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
of Subsection (2Xa); deleted former Subsection
(3Xb), which provided for the maintenance of
reduced speed school zones for state highways
as required under Section 41-6-21; added a
proviso at the end of Subsection (3XbXii); added
Subsection (3Xc); and made related changes.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 120, effective
May 2, 1994, deleted "(a) Before January 1,
1993" at the beginning of Subsection (2); redesignated former Subsections (2XaXi) and
(2XaXii) as Subsections (2Xa) and (2Kb); deleted former Subsection (2Xb), the substance of
which was incorporated into Subsection (2Xa)
by the addition of "after written assurance by a

41-6-44

local authority that the local authority will
comply with Subsections (3) and (4)"; redesignated the subsections in Subsection (3) and
deleted former Subsection (3Xb), which read
"Notwithstanding Subsection (aXiiXB) the department shall provide for the maintenance of
reduced speed school sones for state highways
as required under Section 41-6-21"; substituted
"Department of Transportation* for "Iransportation Commission" in Subsection (6); and
made stylistic changes,
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

ARTICLE 4
ACCIDENTS
41*6-29. Operator's duty at accident — Stop at accident —
Penalty.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Corpus delicti
In order for the state to establish corpus
delicti, the state must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the person who left

the scene was in fact the driver of the vehicle
and not merely a passenger. State v. Hansen,
219 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct App. 1993).

ARTICLES
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license — Penalties.
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
81

41-6-44

MOTOR VEHICLES

(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily iiyury upon another as a proximate
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the
time of the offense.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes any similar local
ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work
in a community-service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more
than 50 hours.
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem
condition involving alcohol or drugs.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation committed within six years
of a prior violation under this section the court shall as part of any
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work
in a community-service work program for not less than 80 hours nor more
than 240 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility.
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two
prior violations under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and
(7); and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for
violations committed after April 23,1990.
82
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(b) (i) Under Subsection (aXi) the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than
2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the
program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term
closely supervised follow through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
[7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within
six years of the prior violations under this section is a third degree felony
if at least three prior convictions are for violations committed after April
23,1990.
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose afineof not less than
$1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours
nor more than 2,160 hours.
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail
sentence.
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing
alternative to incarceration or community service if the program
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely
supervised follow through after the treatment.
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.
8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served
Probation or parole resultingfroma conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that:
83
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(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education,
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after
July 1,1993, have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within
six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed
after July 1,1993.
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things,
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as
a prior conviction under Subsection (10).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction under
Subsection (10), as the court would render in connection with applying
respectively, thefirst,second, or subsequent conviction requirements
of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section
41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first,
second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior
conviction.
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any
community-based or other education program provided for in this section
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services.
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea ofguilty or no contest to
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation,
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of.
Section 41-6-45 as follows.
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea ofguilty or no contest
to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for
84
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the record that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation, the
resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and
(7).
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted
for the first time under Subsection (1); and
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any
subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed
within a period of six yearsfromthe date of the prior violation.
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended
under Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, I 84; C. 1943,
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, I 1; 1957, ch. 75,
I 1; 1967, ch, 8S, § 2; 1969, ch. 107,1 2; 1977,
ch. 268, | S; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63,
i 2; 1982, ch, 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, t 13; 1983,
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183,1 33; 1985, ch. 46,
I 1; 1986, ch. 122, I 1; 1986, ch. 178,1 29;
1987, ch. 138, i 37; 1987 (1st SA), eh, 8, t 2;
1988, ch. 17, I 1; 1990, ch. 183,1 16; 1990,
ch. 299,1 1; 1991, ch. 147,1 1; 1993, ch. 168,
I 1; 1993, ch. 193, ^ 1; 1993, ch. 234, I 32;
1994, eh. 159,1 1; 1994, ch. 263,1 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment by ch. 159, effective March 17, 1994,
added Subsection (SXaXiiXB), making related
changes, and substituted "Section 53-3-223" for
"41-2-130" in Subsection (12Xb).
The 1994 amendment by eh. 263, effective
May 2, 1994, subdivided Subsection (12Xa),
substituted -53-3-223" for "41-2-130" in Subsection (12Xb), and made stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Searches.
In a prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, exigent circumstances, including the concern of the police about the dissipation of blood alcohol and the possible loss or

corruption of that evidence, justified a warrantless search of defendant's home. City of Orem v.
Henrie, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah Ct App.
1994).

41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Failure to comply with standards.
Failure to comply fully with standards established by the Department of Public Safety does
not necessarily make breath test evidence inadmissible. It simply means that the founds-

tion and validity of the evidence may not be
presumed, but rather that they will have to be
established in order for the evidence to be
admitted. Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 223 Utah
Adv. Rep. 42 (Ct App. 1993).

86

311

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 11

Rule 10. Arraignment
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the recordsfromthe
magistrate following a bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned
in the district court. Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall
consist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or stating to
him the substance of the charge and calling on him to plead thereto. He shall
be given a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon to
plead.
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional time in which to
plead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time may be granted.
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any proceeding provided for by statute or these rules prior to arraignment shall be specifically
and expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is
waived.
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own recognizance,;
prior to arraignment and thereafter fails to appear for arraignment or trial
when required to do so, a warrant of arrest may issue and bail may be forfeited.
Cross-References. — Harmless error,
UJtCr.P. 30.

Rights of accused, Utah Const, Art I, |§ 7
to 13; § 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
thereto; and where defendant was not given
*jJX- w
t J
time to plead to such information, court comAdditional tone to plead.
^ ^ ^ e r r o r S t a t e v> J e n 8 e x i | &
witttd
Waiver of objections.
U u h 4 5 2 f 3 0 PJM 203 (1934).
Additional time to plead.
Waiver of objections.
Where original information did not state
Subdivision (c) merely reaffirms the general
public offense and was amended so as to state legal rule that all objections, including those to
public offense for first time, as amending infor- proceedings in the circuit court, must be made
mation in larceny prosecution so as to allege before a guilty plea is entered or the objections
ownership of property alleged to have been sto- will be waived. State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d
len, it was equivalent of a new information re- 496 (Utah Ct App. 1990), rev'd on other
quiring arraignment of defendant and his plea grounds, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
ANALYSIS

Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Key Numbers, — Criminal Law *» 261(1),
Law §§ 433 to 438.
263, 264.
C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law f 355 et
seq.

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear,
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury
trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:

Rule 11
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(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence,
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits forfilingany motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be
approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to
sentence is not binding on the court,
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea.
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appealfromthe judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.)
Amendment Notes. — Ifce 1993 amendment, effective May 1,1993, revised the subdivision designations, substituting letters for
numbers and vice versa; inserted "or guilty
and mentally ill" in the introductory para*
graph in Subdivision (e) and in Subdivision (0;
rewrote Subdivision (eX3) to list more rights;
inserted "and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence" in
Subdivision (eX5); added Subdivision (eX8); de-

leted "that contemplates entry of a plea in the
expectation that other charges will be dropped
or dismissed" after "has been reached" in Subdivision (hX2); added Subdivision (i); and made
stylistic changes throughout the rule.
Cross-References, — Inadmissibility of
pleas, plea discussions or related statements,
UJLE. 410.
Time limit forfilingmotion to withdraw plea
of guilty or no contest, I 77-13-6.

APPENDIX II
Transcript of Arraignment and Guilty Plea

ORIGINAL
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
3

STATE OF UTAH,

4
5

Plaintiff ,
vs.

)

6

SHAUN LYNN FORSBERG,

7

Defendant.

Case No.

941000039

8

BE IT REMEMBERED that on May 31, 1994, the

9

above-entitled matter came on for arraignment'on the

10

Law and Motion Calendar, Box Elder County Courthouse,

11

District Court Courtroom, Brigham City, Utah, the

12

Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
*

13
14
15

presiding.
*

*

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff

ROGER F. BARON
Deputy County Attorney
45 North First East
Brigham City, UT
84302

For the Defendant:

KENT E. SNIDER
Attorney at Law
Suite 102
2568 Washington Blvd
Ogden, UT 84401

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
P. O. Box 873
: i t y ,, UT
84
31
Brigham City
84302-0873
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COURT OF APPEALS

By.

A

..

case t*W(cmmi*
yV/ti

1
2

THE CLERK:

Case number 941000039, State of Utah

vs. Forsberg.

3

MR. SNIDER:

4

Forsberg, Your Honor.

5I

THE COURT:

Attorney Kent Snider for Mr.
Mr. Forsberg is here.

This is the time set for arraignment.

Sir, are you Shaun Lynn Forsberg?
MR. FORSbERG:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Have you had an opportunity to confer

with Mr. Snider?
MR. SNIDER:
THE COURT:

Just briefly, Your Honor.
Have you received a copy of the

information?
MR. SNIDER:
THE COURT:

We have.
Do you waive the formal reading of

that information?
MR. SNIDER:
THE COURT:

Yes, we do.
Do you need any additional time to

consider the matter before entering a plea?
MR. SNIDER:

Not at this time, Your Honor.

We

are prepared today to enter a plea of not guilty.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Forsberg, are you

currently under the influence of any alcohol or drugs?
MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:

No, sir.

Are you having any difficulty

understanding the proceedings this afternoon?
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MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:
follows:

No,

sir.

The information

Driving

under

charges you as'

the influence

of a l c o h o l r a

felony of the third degree, at Box Elder County on or
about

February

12th, 1994, in violation, of

41-6-44 of the Utah

Code.

As to that charge how do you
MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:
benefit

Not

MR. SNIDER:

feel

there would

this for a pretrial

be

some

in two weeks?

I think we can probably

then if not sooner, Your
THE COURT:

plead?

guilty.

Do counsel

to schedule

Section

settle

it by

Honor.

All right.

for June 13th for a pretrial

Let's

set it down,

conference

then,

at two

o'clock .
MR. SNIDER:
THE COURT:
going

That would be fine, Your
Mr. Snider,

to be scheduling

13th.

if I do that I'm

a trial until

Does the defendant

Honor.

at least

waive his right

not
the

to a speedy

trial?
MR. SNIDER:

A moment, Your

Honor.

(Pause in the proceedings J
MR. SNIDER:
THE COURT:
13th r

That's

fine, Your

All right.

two o'clock,

We'll

for a p r e t r i a l .

Paoe 3

Honor.
set it for June

(Other cases
THE CLERK:

Case number

941000039,

heard.)

State of Utah

vs • Forsberg.
THE COURT:
with your

Have you had an opportunity

client?

MR. SNIDER:
Mr. Forsberg
guilty.

I have.

is prepared

It's my understanding
to now enter

of guilty

to make

in this

matter.

MR. BARON:

That's

correct.

basically

to allow him credit

he's going
recommend

into an in-patient
that

the court

the court wishes

agreement

agree to recommend
THE COURT:

program,

they're

agreed

allow

credit

program

to give him.

on the amount

will get probation.

We've

and

felony.

for time served

allow him

on any time in the in-patient

that

and,
--

against

any

jail

no

of jail time or whether

If he does get probation

All right.

if

day to day

There's

that he get those

that

of

to the third degree

The State has some recommendations

time

a plea

He'll withdraw his plea of not guilty

enter his plea

willing

to visit

he

we would

credits.

Anything more

to the

recommendation?
MR. SNIDER:
recently

sentenced

which actually

No, Your Honor.

Mr. Forsberg

was

in Logan on a Class A misdemeanor,

occurred,

I think, after

Page 4

this one.

But

1

with

2

got kind

3

already prepared

4

only thing holding him now from getting

5

is this charge right now.

6

taken

7

with AP&P

8

the Logan presentence

9

have it before

10

the timing between
of confused.

the sentencing
That presentence

and he's doing

care of he can get
and they'll

All right.

address you

I'm

12

questions.

I want you

13

make sure you understand

14

af ternoon .

15

to the defendant

17

MR. SNIDER:

19

going

the Circuit

an update

We should

be able

on
to

13th.

Mr. Forsberg, before I

to ask your attorney
to listen

closely.

the proceedings

a few
I want

to

this

explained

Yes, Your Honor, here and also at

Have you reviewed

his Constitutional

21

proceeding?

22

MR.

23

THE COURT:

25

talked

Court.

THE COURT:

SNIDER:

understands

The

by you?

20

24

is

this

I've

Mr. Snider, has the charge been

16

18

into a program.

report.

it

into a program

As soon as he has

try and expedite

11

report

time in Logan.

the court on the

THE COURT:

and whatnot,

with the

rights as relate

to this

Yes.
Do you believe

the

the nature of the charge

MR. SNIDER:

defendant

I believe

so, Your

defendant
against
Honor.

him?

THE COURT:
about

to make

Do you believe

is voluntary,

that

knowing

the plea
and

he's

with

understanding?
MR,

SNIDER:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Do you know of any reason

should not plead

guilty

MR. SNIDER:

No, Your

THE COURT:
understands
guilty

time?

Honor.

Is it your opinion

the effect

and meaning

that

the

defendant

of entering a

plea?

MR. SNIDER:

Yes, Your Honor.

the consequences,
a felony,
to.

at this

why he

specifically

and the prison

He's willing
THE COURT:

difficulty

talked

about

in regards

to a plea

time he could be

subjected

to enter a plea
Mr. Forsberg,

understanding

We've

at this

time.

have you had

the proceedings

of

any

this

a fternoon?
MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:
you've received

sir.

Are you satisfied
from your

MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:

No,

advice

Yes, sir.

confer with him before we go

THE COURT:

the

attorney?

Do you need

MR. FORSBERG:

with

No,

any further

time to

forward?

sir.

You've heard

the statements
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from

your

1

attorney.

2

time?

Do you wish

3

MR. FORSBERG:

4

THE COURT:

5

influence

of any alcohol

MR. FORSBERG:

7

THE COURT:
any physical

9

I'm

or mental

not,

seeing

111

Bear River Mental Health.

12

helping me out up there.
THE COURT:

14

would

15

understand

THE COURT:

18

MR. FORSBERG:
seeing him

All

for

jail I've

they call

They've kind of

that

it,

No,

been

through

been

circumstance

what we're doing and what you're

17

21

any treatment

in any way interfere with your ability

MR. FORSBERG:

20

I believe

Do you feel that

16

19

sir.

In the Cache County

a phychologist,

the

illness?

10

13

not under

or drugs?

Are you receiving

MR. FORSBERG:

this

Yes, sir.

You are presently

6

8

to enter a guilty plea at

today

to

doing?

sir.

right.
It's for depression,

is what

I'm

for.

THE COURT:

All right.

you have a right

to plead

22

MR. FORSBERG:

23

THE COURT:

Do you understand

not guilty

if you so

choose?

Yes.

If you enter a plea of guilty

24

have certain rights which you will be waiving.

25

briefly

review

that

those for you.

You have

you
I'll

the right to a

speedy

trial, the right

jury, the right

to have

to a trial before
legal

counsel/

appointed

by the court or retained

the right

to confront

witnesses

and

You have the right
have

the right

behalf
require

against

to compel

at no cost

doubt.

convicted,

you would

State's

to appear

behalf.

to

beyond a

a trial, you

the right

You

in your

You have the right

If, following
have

the

have

self-incrimination.

to prove your guilt

reasonable

You

in your own

witnesses

to you.

the State

by you.

a defense

impartial

either

and cross-examine

to present

an

to appeal

were
that

convi ction.
If you plead guilty you waive
of the foregoing
you understand

rights

that I've

just

and

lose

all

explained.

Do

that?

MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Are you willing

to waive

all of

those

rights?
MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:
the offense which
beyond

Yes, sir.

The information

the elements

the State would be required

a reasonable

defendant,

and

doubt

are as follows:

on or about February

That

control

vehicle, within the state of Utah, while his

Page 8

to prove

12th, 1994, did

a vehicle, or was in actual physical

of

the
drive

of a
blood

1

alcohol content was .08 percent or greater by weight,

2

or while under the influence of alcohol; and ha's ha<3

3

three prior convictions under the above section within

41 six years*

Do you understand

5

MR- FORSBERG:

6

THE COURT:

7

Yes, sir.

Are you satisfied with the advice

you've received from your attorney?

8

MR. FORSBERG:

9

THE COURT:

10

that?

Yes, sir.

Do you need any more time to talk to

him?

11

MR. FORSBERG:

12

THE COURT:

No, sir.

Have there been any promises made to

13

you other than the statements made just now in court

14

by the prosecutor and your attorney?

15

MR. FORSBERG:

16

THE COURT:

No, sir.

You understand that any agreement or

17

any recommendations would not be binding on the court,

18

that they would simply be recommendations?

19

MR. FORSBERG:

20

THE COURT:

21

Yes, sir.

Has anyone used any force or pressure

or intimidation to cause you to plead guilty?

22

MR. FORSBERG:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. FORSBERG:

25

THE COURT:

No, sir.

Are you doing so voluntarily?
Yes, sir.

Are you pleading guilty because you

are in fact guilty of the offense?
MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Do you have any questions you want to

ask or any statement you would like to make before
entering a plea?
MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:

No, sir.

As to the charge, then, driving under

the influence of alcohol, a felony of the third
degree, how do you plead?
MR. FORSBERG:
THE COURT:
plea.

Guilty.

The court will accept the guilty

It appears to the court to be freely,

voluntarily and knowingly made.

The time for imposing

sentence is not less than two nor more than 30 days.
We'll schedule this for two weeks.

If for some reason

we encounter difficulties and had to go beyond the 30
days/ are you willing to waive the 30 day sentencing
requirement?
(Pause in the proceedings.)
MR. SNIDER:
THE COURT:

He is, Your Honor.
All right.

I need to advise you that

you may seek, for good cause shown, to withdraw the
guilty plea, but you must do so within 30 days from
today's date.

If you don't ask to have it withdrawn

within that 30 day period you forfeit that right.
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ll

Now, I'll

schedule

2

June 13th at three p.m.

3

expedited,

4

Cache

5
6

or updated,

7

report

ask AP&P

on

to give us ;an

of what was done

from

County.
MR. BARON:

right

We'll

this for sentencing

Can we have the defendant waive

to a copy of that
MR. SNIDER:

ten days prior

We are prepared

to do that.

9

we have to do that so we can be back here on 'the 13th.

11

statutory

12

days before

Do you understand

right

14

THE COURT:

15

you sentenced

16

waive

on the 13th of June.

ten day advance

MR. FORSBERG:

18

THE COURT:
be ready until

21

THE COURT:

24
25

Are you willing

that that report will

not

sentencing.

More than likely,
All right.

yes.

Anything

further, Mr.

Snider?
MR. SNIDER:
court's

time.

get

notice?

the Friday before

MR. SNIDER:

I can't

Yes, sir.

I suspect

20

23

ten

Yes.

If I allow you that right

17

22

report

sentencing?

MR. FORSBERG:

19

understands

that you have a

to see that presentence

13

that

and he

I've

discussed

THE COURT:

the defendant

hearing?

8

10

that with

to the

his

No f

Your Honor.

Thank you.*

I appreciate

the

to
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STATE OF UTAH
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THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the arraignment

proceed-

ings were taken before me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and
for the State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah
That said proceedings were reported by me in
stenotype and thereafter were by me transcribed

into

typewriting; and that a full, true and correct transcription is set forth in the pages numbered 2 to 11,
inclusive.
I further certify that the original

transcript

was filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court,
Box Elder County, Brigham City, Utah.
I further certify that I am not associated with
any of the parties to said matter and I am not
interested in the event thereof*
Witness my hand and official seal at Brigham
City, Utah, this 7th day of November, 1994.
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